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I. INTRODUCTION
Joseph Stiglitz, Nobel Prize winner in Economic Sciences, recently reminded us
that “in the world of economics, things are never as they seem.”1 In these times of
economic distress when conflicting facts and figures are swirling around us, it is
helpful to be reminded of Albert Einstein’s caution: “It is theory that determines
what can be observed.” In this context it is also useful to recall the adage: “You
stand where you sit.” An example here is the current rate of unemployment in the
United States (U.S.). We are told that the unemployment rate in the U.S. today is just
under 10%. In the aggregate this is true. But when we see the unemployment rate
along household income distribution, a different picture emerges.
The chart below shows that the burdens of hard economic times fall on different
income groups differently. Here it is instructive to take into account an almost
century-old statement of Andrew Mellon: “In a depression, assets return to their
rightful owners.”2 The current Great Recession has substantiated Mellon’s
proposition. Global losses in the financial sector alone exceed $3.6 trillion, and the
bill for worldwide public rescue of financial institutions is $20 trillion. The special
inspector general for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) estimates that the
long-term total potential cost of just the U.S. tax-payers’ rescue of finance capital is
*
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1

JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, FREEFALL: AMERICA, FREE MARKETS, AND THE SINKING OF THE
WORLD ECONOMY 71 (2010) [hereinafter STIGLITZ, FREEFALL].
2

Andrew Mellon, banker and U.S. Secretary of the Treasury 1921-32, quoted in DAVID
HARVEY, THE ENIGMA OF CAPITAL AND THE CRISES OF CAPITALISM 11 (2010).
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$23.7 trillion - over 150 percent of GDP. We are also told that “Wall Street only
became stronger as a result of the financial crisis.”3 Joseph Stiglitz reports that the
2008-09 bailout of the financial sector is “the largest redistributions of wealth in
such a short period of time in history.”4 In order to unpack all of this, we will take a
journey that will take us to Greece and then bring us back home.

II. PIIGS & ITRAXX SOVX
Over the last year, Greece has found itself at the epicenter of European debt
crisis. PIIGS has become a short-hand for the countries facing serious debt servicing
problem – Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain. The following chart shows the
debt to GDP ratio for PIIGS, along with the U.S.

3

SIMON JOHNSON AND JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS, THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND THE
NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 156 (2010).
4

STIGLITZ, FREEFALL, supra note 1, at 200.
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The iTraxx SovX Western Europe Index is an investment fund that represents an
unweighted average of the credit default swap (CDS) spreads of fifteen European
sovereign bond issuers. It was launched in September 2009, returned handsome
profits to investors, and “let traders gamble on Greece . . . [as] derivatives . . .
assumed an outsize role in Europe’s debt crisis.”5 A financial expert opined that “the
iTraxx SovX did not create the situation, but it has exacerbated it . . . . Credit-default
swaps give illusion of safety but actually increase systemic risk.”6 Another expert
termed credit derivatives “the most dangerous instruments yet,” and added that
“[i]nnovation has now cost us $7 trillion. That’s a pretty high price to pay for
innovation.”7

While iTraxx SovX multiplied its investors’ wealth, Greece was brow-beaten by
the bond markets and adopted severe “austerity” measures. These measures included
wage freezes, public employee layoffs, sales tax hike of 21% on goods and services,
a higher retirement age, and a role back of concessions won by the working classes
over a generation. After foot-dragging for months, European Union (EU) leaders
reached “extraordinary agreement” to provide a rescue package of $1 trillion – “a
financial bazooka”− to stop the spreading debt crisis.8 The International Monetary
Fund’s (IMF) and EU hope that the sum, which may rise to “more than a quarter of
5
Nelson D. Schwartz & Eric Dash, Banks Bet Greece Defaults on Debt They Helped
Hide, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2010, at A1.
6

Id.

7

Gretchan Morgenson, It’s Time for Swaps to Lose Their Swagger, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28,
2010, at B1.
8

Christine Hauser, Stocks Soar After Europe Announces Rescue Plan, N.Y. TIMES, May
11, 2010, at B1.
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the bloc’s [GDP] [will] prevent troubled institutions from falling.”9 The plan came
after “some not so subtle prodding” from President Obama, worried about the threat
of the debt crisis to “the still-fragile” recoveries in the U.S. and Asia.10 Knowledgeable observers believe that the Greek bailout is likely to follow the model of the
World Bank and IMF bailout of Russia after the 1998 default – “European tax payers
paying for the bailout while investors in Greek debt are largely made whole.”11
As the long, hot summer of 2010 comes to a close, the Greek debt still stands at
114 percent of its GDP. By 2040, Greece would have to spend 20 percent of its GDP
to simply service this debt. The rescue package has “not paid down one penny. [It’s]
just moving around a big pile of debt.”12 Even with interest rates around the world
“stuck to the floor,” Greece has to pay 11 percent on its 5-year bonds, while Germany pays 1.4 percent. Many Europeans officials, including the French president, now
believe that Europe’s banking problems and sovereign debt crisis are “largely the
creation of speculators out to make a profit.”13 EU’s $1 trillion “financial bazooka”
increasingly looks like the U.S. financial institution rescue plan, “a win-win-lose
proposal: the banks win, investors win – and taxpayers lose.”14
The debt crisis of Greece has brought into sharp relief the drastically uneven
distribution of gain and pain in an economic crisis. This Greek tragedy also underscores that borrowing from the bond market to make up budgetary shortfalls rather
than relying on taxation has a profound impact on public policies and accountability
as the state becomes beholden to capital owning classes, particularly the bond
market. The Greek debt crisis also substantiates that in the face of unbridled global
mobility of finance capital, governments increasingly are “hostages to financialmarket sentiments, [and] compelled to take account of investor concerns at every
turn.”15 The thesis that unchecked international capital flows result in “dramatically
more regressive income distribution and an effective veto over public policy,” has
come true.16 In order to understand how this came about, we have to take into acco9
Jack Ewing and Matthew Saltmarsh, Doubts Persist as Most European Banks Pass
Stress Test, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2010, at B4.
10

Steven Erlanger, Katrin Bennhold & David E. Sanger, After Half Steps, Major Rescue
Took a Nudge from Washington, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2010, at A1.
11

Andrew E. Kramer, The Euro in 2010 Feels Like the Rubble in 1998, N.Y. TIMES, May
12, 2010, at B4.
12
Christopher Swann & Nicholas Paisner, History is Hardly on Greece’s Side, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 13, 2010, at B2.
13

Matthew Saltmarsh, Default Fears Return to European Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26,
2010, at B3.
14

Joseph E. Stiglitz, Obama’s Ersatz Capitalism, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2009, at A31.
Stiglitz views these plans as “the kind of Rube Goldberg device that Wall Street loves –
clever, complex and nontransparent, allowing huge transfers of wealth to the financial
markets.” Id.
15

Benjamin J. Cohen, Phoenix Risen: The Resurrection of Global Finance, 48 WORLD
POLITICS 268, 286 (1996).
16
Id. Historically, increases in the mobility of taxable property had always forced political
authorities to “bargain with those who possess property rights over the moveable tax base and
to share with them formal control over the conduct of public affairs.” Id. (quoting Robert H.
Bates & Da-Hsiang Donald Lien, A Note on Taxation, Development, and Representative
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unt the neoliberal reordering of the U.S. and global financial system over the last
thirty years.
III. CRISES OF CAPITALISM AND THE KEYNESIAN COMPROMISE
We have to start with reminding ourselves of the twin chronic crises of
capitalism: the tendency of the rate of profit to fall and the unsustainability of
aggregate demand resulting in overproduction. Add to this the tendency of finance
capital towards crisis. As Hayman Minski established, finance capital invariably
goes through the cycle of hedge financing, speculative financing, Ponzi financing,
and the “Minski moment” when the over-stretched institutions freeze credit and
trigger in a system wide crisis.17 After a pause, the cycle starts all over again. The
chart below shows this history of boom and bust of the financial sector.

Government, 14 POLITICS & SOCIETY 53, 57 (1985). A study of four European welfare states
demonstrated that “as business and finance became more mobile, their power resources
increased, and those of labor decreased,” and governments “lost the ability to carve out
national economic strategies and to sustain social accords.” PAULETTE KURZER, BUSINESS AND
BANKING: POLITICAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN WESTERN EUROPE, viii (1993).
The result is “the abandonment of policies traditionally associated with social democracy –
including numerous entitlement programs; redistributive income policies; and consensual
tripartite exchanges among business, labor, and government.” COHEN, supra note 15, at 286.
See also Jonathan W. Moses, Abdication from National Policy Autonomy: What’s Left to
Leave? 22 POLITICS AND SOCIETY 125 (1994).
17
Hyman P. Minski, The Financial Instability Hypothesis (The Jerome Levy Economics
Institute, Working Paper No. 74, 1992), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=161024. Financial speculative boom typically ends with the “Minski moment” the moment it becomes clear that borrowers are overextended and need to sell assets to meet
debt obligations. Justin Lahart, In Time of Tumult, Obscure Economist Gains Currency, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 18, 2007, at A1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB11873658545690104
7.html. For a succinct exposition of Minsky’s views about finance, see JOHN CASSIDY, HOW
MARKETS FAIL: THE LOGIC OF ECONOMIC CALAMITIES 205-217 (2010).
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The 1929 crash and the subsequent Great Depression triggered a foundational
change in economic theory and public policy. Keynesian economic theory and the
New Deal aimed at saving capitalism from itself by containing the boom and bust
cycles. The primary instrument to do so was establishing an elaborate system of
public interventions and regulation of the market aimed at stabilizing aggregate
demand and containing speculative tendencies of finance capital. This was also the
birth of welfare systems. In the words of Asa Briggs:
A ‘welfare state’ is a state in which organized power is deliberately used
(through politics and administration) in an effort to modify the play of
market forces in at least three directions – first, by guaranteeing
individuals and families a minimum income irrespective of the market
value of their work or their property; second by narrowing the extent of
‘social contingencies’, for example, sickness, old age or unemployment)
which lead otherwise to individual and family crises; and third by
ensuring that all citizens without distinction of status or class are offered
the best standards available in relation to an agreed range of social
18
services.
It was this containment of capitalism that relatively leveled the playing field
between capital-owners and the working classes, and opened the door for expansion
of economic and civil rights. Following World War II, a similar system of contained
and regulated international financial system was established at Bretton Woods. In the
words of Henry Morgenthau, the aim was a “New Deal in international economics . . . driving the usurious money lenders out of the temple of international
finance.”19 Pegging the dollar with gold, fixed exchange rates and cross-border
capital controls were the hallmarks of this system. The combination of international
and national regulations produced what is known as the “golden age of capitalism” the period between 1945-71 that produced sustained growth and contained boom and
bust cycles.
This golden age, however, came to an end; a death triggered by the fall of income
of the capital owning classes and weakening of the dollar due to escalating U.S.
balance of payment deficits. The two charts below show the career of the income of
the wealth owning classes in the U.S.

18
Asa Briggs, The Welfare State in Historical Perspective, in THE WELFARE STATE
READER 16 (2nd ed. 2006).
19

Leo Panitch & Sam Gindin, Finance and American Empire, in THE EMPIRE RELOADED
46, 49-50 (Leo Panitch and Colin Leys eds., 2005).
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As these charts show clearly, the period of containment of finance capital and
expansion of welfare systems put pressure on the income of the wealth owning
classes. Concurrently, U.S. balance of payment deficits resulted in an outflow of
dollars and the emergence of the unregulated Euromarket and the so-called Triffin
dilemma – the Bretton Woods system had created an incentive for reserve banks
around the world to accumulate dollars as their convertibility was guaranteed;
however, the greater such accumulation is relative to U.S. gold reserves, the greater
the risk to the guarantee. With overseas dollars rapidly exceeding gold reserves of
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the U.S., the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) declared a “genuine dollar
crisis”20 in 1971.
The first U.S. response to the crisis was the Nixon Shock of 1971 – the end of
dollar-gold convertibility. In effect, this amounted to a unilateral default. It, in turn,
created a crisis of confidence of the bond market. What would it take for the bond
markets to finance expanding U.S. balance of payment and fiscal deficits? Will the
bond markets accept IOUs in the shape of U.S. Treasury Bills? This is the context of
the birth of the neoliberal counterrevolution. I call it a counterrevolution, as it aimed
at undoing the Keynesian welfare compromise between capital and labor. Here it is
critical to understand the politics of monetary policy by way of its impact on
inflation and unemployment. Inflation is the enemy of the bond market, while
unemployment is the enemy of working classes. The neoliberal counterrevolution’s
immediate aim was suppression of inflation in the interest of the bond market.
IV. THE NEOLIBERAL COUNTER REVOLUTION
After road-tests in General Augusto Pinochet’s Chile, where the “Chicago Boys”
used tight monetary policy to break the back of labor unions, and in New York,
where the city was forced to make spending cuts and unions were forced to make
concessions in return for funding of deficits, neoliberalism was ready to be launched
on a grand scale. The Volcker Shock of October 1979 was the opening blow that
induced a severe recession which contained spiraling inflation and cutting unions
down to size. The federal base rate rose from 8% in 1978 to 19% in 1981, and
triggered the worst recession since the Great Depression. Output dropped by 2.2% in
1982 and unemployment reached 9.7%. Inflation dropped from 13.5% in 1980 to
3.2% in 1983. Confidence of the financial markets was restored through radical use
of monetary policy. U.S. Treasury bills became “coin of the (global) realm,” and
secondary markets in bonds flourished. Paul Volcker characterized it as “the triumph
of central banking.”21 To sustain this radical monetary policy, a political
counterrevolution was launched in the shape of the Reagan/Thatcher agenda aimed
at strangulating the unions and starving the welfare state. This political agenda was
facilitated by an ideological assault on the welfare systems. Margaret Thatcher
famously summed up the posture: “There is no such thing as society.”22 “Culture
wars” displaced class conflicts, and the war on poverty was turned into a war on the
poor. Civil rights and women’s rights were displaced by “family values,” and
working-class coalition by the “moral majority.” The “efficient market hypothesis”
of the Chicago school furnished intellectual heft to the project.23 It was claimed that
20

BANK OF INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS (BIS), ANNUAL REPORTS, 3 (1979); see also,
BARRY J. EICHENGREEN, GLOBALIZING CAPITAL: A HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY SYSTEM (2008).
21
Paul Volcker, The Triumph of Central Banking?, PER JACOBSON FOUNDATION LECTURE
SERIES, Sept. 23, 1990, http://www.perjacobsson.org/lectures/1990.pdf.
22

Douglas Keay, Aids, Education and the Year 2000, WOMAN’S OWN, Oct. 31, 1987, at 8,
available at http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/106689.
23

See JOHN CASSIDY, HOW MARKETS FAIL: THE LOGIC OF ECONOMIC CALAMITIES (2009);
Robert Wade, The First-World Debt Crisis of 2007 – 2010 in Global Perspective,
CHALLENGE, July-Aug. 2008, at 34; JUSTIN FOX, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL MARKET: A
HISTORY OF RISK, REWARD, AND DELUSION ON WALL STREET (2009). One scholar notes that
“an ideological backlash against state economic interventionism” played a key part in this
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“the economic approach provides a useful framework for understanding all human
behavior.”24 Inflation-busting through radical monetary policy, supply-side economic
policy, and a promise of “trickle-down” became defining features of the U.S. political economy.
The neoliberal counterrevolution entailed an extensive redesigning of the regulatory regimes related to finance. Regulatory regimes born from the New Deal and the
Keynesian consensus were set aside or drastically modified. In addition, a host of
new regulations were fashioned to achieve hegemony of finance capital in particular.
The critical legislations that enabled neoliberal financialization were the Depository
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, which eliminated
interest rate caps; the addition of the 401K provision to the tax code in 1980, which
channeled incomes into private pension plans; the Garn-St. Germain Depository
Institutions Act of 1982, which lifted restrictions on the savings and loan industry to
enter commercial lending and corporate bonds and allowed inter-state mergers
between banks and S&Ls; the Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of
1984, which permitted investment banks to buy, pool, and resell mortgages in slices
with varying levels of risk; the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which created the Real
Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit, making mortgage-backed securities more
attractive; the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enhancement Act of
1989, which rearranged the government-sponsored entity landscape; the Interstate
Banking and Branching Act of 1994, which allowed banks to operate across state
lines; the Community Reinvestment Act, which directed financial institutions to
expand their market base; the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (Financial Services
Modernization Act) of 1999, which repealed the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933; the
Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000, which left derivatives out of
regulatory oversight; and the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005, which made it difficult for consumers to seek the protections
of bankruptcy. The courts and regulatory agencies played their supportive role. In
1986, the courts upheld the Federal Reserve’s ruling that commercial banks’ placing
commercial paper issued by corporations with investors did not violate the GlassSteagall Act. A November, 2001 rule jointly adopted by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), the Federal
reordering of the markets. Philip G. Cerny, The Deregulation and Re-regulation of Financial
Markets in a More Open World, in FINANCE AND WORLD POLITICS: MARKETS, REGIMES, AND
STATES IN THE POST HEGEMONIC ERA 51 (Philip G. Cerny ed. 1993). Another notes the critical
role of “widely shared ideological commitments” and “mindsets.” David M. Andrews, Capital
Mobility and State Autonomy: Towards a Structural Theory of International Monetary
Relations, 38 INT’L STUD. Q. 193, 200-201 (1994). One should emphasize the global
dimension of this phenomenon because of “international patterns of elite interaction . . .
[which] are explicitly concerned to foster . . . a shared outlook among the international
establishments of the major capitalist countries.” Stephen R. Gill & David Law, Global
Hegemony and the Structural Power of Capital, 33 INT’L STUD. Q. 475, 483 (1989). The
efficient market hypothesis triggered a world view that saw all human behavior as being
uniformly dictated by an impulse to maximize gains and all facets of life operating in a
competitive market of some sort. See GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN
BEHAVIOR (1976). For critical evaluations, see DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE
HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR DECISIONS (2008); Alexander Rosenberg, Review
Symposium: Can Economic Theory Explain Everything? 9:4 PHIL. SOC. SCI. 509 (1979).
24

Becker, supra note 23, at 14.
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Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the Federal Reserve tied the bank capital
requirement in securitization to the ability of banks to get rating agencies to approve
the investment. On April 28, 2004, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
agreed to allow large investment banks to use their own “risk management practices
for regulatory purposes.”25 This decision facilitated investment banks to increase
their leverage to 40 to 1. The basic principle behind oligarchies, that economic
power yields political power, translated well in the course of neoliberal regulatory
design for finance capital, a design which substantiated George Stigler’s thesis that
“as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated
primarily for its benefit.”26
One area that was significantly left out of the purview of regulatory oversight
was derivatives, which were to wreak havoc down the road. This considered
abdication came from a desire to both accelerate the hegemony of finance capital and
the imperial role of the U.S. In November of 1999, the President’s Working Group
on Financial Markets concluded that “to allow the United States to maintain leadership in these rapidly developing markets . . . derivatives should be exempt from
federal regulation.”27 Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve, found
regulation of derivatives “wholly unnecessary.”28 Larry Summers, the Secretary of
Treasury, said that one of his greatest achievements was ensuring that derivatives
remain unregulated. With the end of the dollar’s convertibility, and the move from
fixed to floating rates, the measure-of-value property of money was rendered highly
unstable. With this increased uncertainty, risk-assessment and risk-hedging became
critical for capital that moves through multiple fluctuating currencies. The market for
derivatives, instruments designed to hedge risk, grew exponentially. Because one did
not have to have a stake in the underlying security to buy a derivative, they quickly
became instruments of speculation rather than risk-management. Besides Credit
Default Swaps, derivatives mushroomed as speculative bets on the movements of
currencies, interest rates, bonds, and stocks. By 2008, derivatives had grown to $350
trillion in face value and $8 trillion in gross market value.
With the neoliberal counterrevolution underway, equity markets in the U.S.
began to rise, propelled by inflow of funds from newly created funded pension
schemes, and big companies increasingly started to rely on equity markets for
finance. In response, commercial banks pushed lending into more marginal markets
25

17 C.F.R. § 200, 240 (2004). See also, KWAK, supra note 3, at 140; Stephen Labaton,
Agency’s ’04 Rule Let Banks Pile Up New Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2008, at A1.
26
George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 1 BELL J. OF ECON. & MANG. SCI. 3
(1971). A century ago, Louis Brandeis argued that the “dominant element in our financial
oligarchy is the investment banker.” LOUIS BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, AND HOW THE
BANKERS USE IT 4 (1914). Today, Barney Frank, Chairman of the House Banking Committee,
takes the position that financial institutions and instruments have taken “a large chunk of the
economy hostage. And we have to pay ransom, like it or not. Barney Frank, quoted in
ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW WALL STREET AND
WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM FROM CRISIS – AND THEMSELVES 38
(2009).
27
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, OVER-THECOUNTER DERVATIVES MARKETS AND COMMODITIES EXCHANGE ACT (Nov. 1999), available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/otcact.pdf.
28

KWAK, supra note 3, at 8.
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and developed new financial instruments and fee-and-commission activities. Lifting
of New Deal banking restrictions accelerated the change towards fee and
commissions and propriety trading of financial assets. This originate-and-distribute
model rested on the creation of complex financial products and selling those quickly
to investors and speculators around the world. With an “originate-and-distribute”
model, “shadow banking” displaced traditional “boring banking.”29 The banks
expanded the scope of the market by hunting out economically marginal groups for
mortgage and consumer credit. In this process, “[e]conomically marginal people
constituted, in effect, a ‘developing country’ within the United States.”30 Aggregate
demand was now propelled by credit and with the rollback of the welfare state, the
poor were to run a “private welfare system” based on credit. As the graphs below
show, household debt exploded and the whole economy turned into primarily a debteconomy.

29

Anastasia Nesvetailova & Ronen Palan, A Very North Atlantic Credit Crunch:
Geopolitical Implications of the Global Liquidity Crisis, 62 J. INT’L AFF. 165, 170-71 (2008).
The originate-and-distribute model entailed no incentive for banks to evaluate borrowers as
the risk would be borne by the final buyer. The originate-and-distribute model distanced
lenders from the consequences of their lending decisions, thus injecting moral hazard into the
heart of the financial system. See KWAK, supra note 3, at 60-87; STIGLITZ, FREEFALL, supra
note 1, at 6-17.
30

Wade, supra note 23, at 31.
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The share of finance capital in profits and incomes in the financial sector grew
exponentially as the graphs below indicate.
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The financial sector became the major source of income for the wealthy, incomes
of CEO skyrocketed, and the share of income of the wealthy increased.
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Rise in inequality was a natural result.
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The financial markets relied on the Federal Reserve to keep the system awash
with liquidity to sustain the credit-driven financialization. Particularly in response to
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the dot.com crash of the early 2000s, the Federal Reserve lowered interest rates and
kept them low, fueling excess liquidity and a credit-fueled boom. The supply of
asset-backed securities doubled between 2003 and 2004, and doubled again between
2004 and 2005. The bond market thrived, as did capital owning classes.
V. THE SCORE-CARD OF NEOLIBERALISM
The score-card of the neoliberal counterrevolution shows spectacular gains for
finance capital at the expense of the larger economy and the working classes. The
record of neoliberalism in stimulating economic growth remained dismal even
before the 2007-09 financial meltdown. Annual growth rates in the quarter century
after 1973, while higher than the earlier period of global capitalism from 1820 to
1945, were below those achieved in the post-war “golden age.”31 While aggregate
growth rates were about 3.5% in the 1960s and 1970s, they were 1.4% in the 1980s,
1.1% in the 1990s, and below 1% after 2000.32 Income inequality increased in more
than three-quarters of Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) countries between the mid-1980s and mid-2000s.33 As the share of labor
income shrank, the phenomenal expansion of the financial sector and its profits
helped the share of business income in the OECD countries to rise from 28% in 1980
to 36% in 2003.34 While in 1982 financial corporations generated 8% of total U.S.
corporate value added and 5% of total corporate profits, by 2007 their share of
corporate value added rose to 16%, and their share of corporate profits went up eight
times to 41%.35 By 2006, the profits per employee in banking were twenty-six times
higher than the average in all other industries worldwide.36 Between 1973 and 2002,
average real income for the bottom 90% fell by 9%, while the top one percent’s real
income rose by 101% and the top 0.1% by 277%.37 The share of national income by
the top 1% of earners in the U.S. fell from a pre-World War II high of 16% to less
than 8% by 1978. The neoliberal turn helped reverse the trend; by 2000, this share
climbed back to 15%. The top 0.1% of income earners increased their share of the
national income from 2% in 1978 to 6% by 1999. The ratio of median compensation
of workers to the salaries of CEOs increased from thirty to one in 1970 to more than
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four hundred to one by 2000.38 The average hours worked by the average American
have risen by equivalent to an extra month’s work per year.39 The household debt
and the corresponding debt servicing burden grew exponentially.40 The debt held by
the U.S. financial sector grew from $2.9 trillion, or 125% of GDP, in 1978 to over
$36 trillion, or 259% of GDP, in 2007.41 Between 1980 and 2000, assets held by the
commercial banks and securities firms grew from 55% of GDP to 95%.42 Financial
sector profits grew for 13% of all domestic corporate profits from 1978 to 1987 to
30% from 1998-2007.43 By 2004, the proportion of corporate profits in the U.S.
going to finance doubled to over 28%, the shares going to the broader financial
sector−combining finance, real estate and insurance−doubled to nearly 50%.44
VI. NEOLIBERALISM GOES GLOBAL
The neoliberal global financial reordering required repositioning of the IMF as
the global enforcer of the new neoliberal order. The role of the U.S.-dominated IMF
was changed from being a currency stabilization fund to that of a manager of foreign
debt crises. Concurrently, the IMF became a global enforcer of neoliberalization
through structural adjustment programs imposed upon any state that needed its
assistance with debt repayments. Debt crises were now used to enforce fiscal
austerity, privatization, and market liberalization, the interlinked pillars of the
Washington Consensus. In 1978, the IMF’s Articles of Agreement were amended to
redefine surveillance and expanded the scope of state policies that could be subjected
to IMF scrutiny. New Guidelines on Conditionality released in 1979 ratified the
expanded surveillance power and laid the basis for conditionality of structural
adjustment that accompanied IMF assistance. The IMF purged Keynesian
economists from its ranks and replaced them with neoliberal monetarists.
Concurrently, the World Bank was turned into “strictly . . . a junior partner, with the
guidelines of the programs dictated by the IMF.” The World Bank’s lending was
switched from project-loans to structural adjustment loans subject to IMF’s approval
and accompanied by IMF-imposed conditionalities.
Keynesian cautions about international capital mobility were jettisoned. The new
IMF dogma is unfettered mobility of capital. As a condition of providing loans to
overcome balance of payment crises, IMF dictates macroeconomic policies of the
38
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debtors reflecting an extreme free market ideology. Conditionalities to availability of
funds now required structural adjustment programs; a policy package widely labeled
“the Washington Consensus” dictated a comprehensive neoliberal economic policy.45
The package typically includes “harsh fiscal austerity,” privatization, and
liberalization.46
With the neoliberal financial regulatory regime of the U.S., the repositioning of
the IMF, and the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) agreement on financial
services in place, the hegemony of global finance capital under the U.S. imperial
umbrella was complete. This neoliberal global financial regime thrives not only
during phases of stability and growth, but also during phases of instability and crisis.
Indeed, even natural disasters are turned into opportunities to enforce rabidly free
market ideologies and policies. This is the context in which international debt crises
increasingly served to entrench neoliberalism globally while feeding finance capital
through accumulation by dispossession.
The neoliberal era has also been an era of incessant international debt crises
starting with Latin America in the early 1980s. The fiction has been long cultivated
that bad loans are always the debtor’s fault. However, in the case of Latin America,
as in subsequent cases too, opportunistic and imprudent overlending by the banks
fueled by access liquidity was the primary cause of excessive debt and the
subsequent crisis. The massive lending to Latin America by U.S. banks in the 1970s
was a prime mechanism to recycle petrodollars - the massive transfer of funds to the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) cartel as a result of the
quadrupling of oil prices in 1973-74. The petrodollars quickly flowed back to
Eurodollar deposits of U.S. banks. The oil price hike had also triggered a recession
in industrialized countries, and the resulting weakness of internal demand came at a
time when the major U.S. banks were losing market share at home. This made
foreign lending more attractive. New markets were quickly found in the Global
South, and the surplus capital in the U.S. started funding a lending boom in Latin
America.
Banks found comfort in the fact that, as the Chairman of Citicorp put it, “Countries never go bankrupt.”47 The primary beneficiaries of the loans were technocrats,
generals, and businessmen who received secret commissions and contracts on the
huge flow of foreign funds. The massive debt was accompanied by massive capital
45
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flight from Latin America. The capital flight was propelled on one hand, by the
incentives of the combination of high exchange rates and the history of inflation in
the region, and, on the other, to distance assets from its often tainted origins. In the
1970s, during which Mexico accumulated $75 billion in foreign debt, its private
sector accumulated $40 billion of foreign assets. In 1980-81, outflow of private
capital from Argentina consisted of 84% of the inflow of debt, and in the case of
Venezuela, the outflow exceeded the inflow.48 For Argentina, Mexico, and
Venezuela combined, the three countries hit hardest by the debt crisis, capital flight
during 1979-82 amounted to 67% of capital inflows.49
Aggressive monetary policy in advanced capitalist countries designed to prevent
domestic inflation, particularly the U.S., “imposed a frightful cost on the less
developed world under the very loans the OECD governments had encouraged their
banks to make.”50 When the crisis hit, banks resisted advancing new fund, and Latin
American governments imposed harsh austerity measure “at the behest of [their]
creditors.”51 The decisive response to the crisis was not market-driven but was
choreographed by the U.S. state. After the aborted “Baker Plan,” the “Brady Plan”
was put in place in 1990.52 Skirting the option of debt forgiveness by official lenders
to ease the debt burden, it focused on the debt to commercial banks through
conversion of loans into collateralized bonds and debt-equity swaps. After
conservable arm-twisting by regulators, banks converted 41% of the total debt into
discounted principal bonds, 49% into discounted interest bonds, and advanced new
money for the remaining 10%.53
For the banks, the restructuring worked out rather well. It signaled an end of the
debt crisis to the broader markets, and debtor countries could borrow and issue
bonds again, generating fees for the banks. Loans having been converted into bonds,
distressed assets went off the balance sheets and freed up capital for other uses. It
gave the banks liquid bonds in place of the relatively illiquid loans, and triggered a
turn-around in secondary market prices of these assets. By 1997, $305 billion of
loans and $2.403 trillion of Brady bonds were traded in secondary markets. While
the Brady Plan resolved the debt crisis from the perspective of creditors, the debt
remains in place, to be serviced at the cost of domestic development and social
services expenditures. Between 1982 and 1990, Latin America repaid far more than
48
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ECONOMY 9 (Jeffrey Sachs ed. 1989).
49

See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1985 64 (1985).

50

Robert A. Pastor, The Debt Crisis: A Financial or a Development Problem? in LATIN
AMERICA’S DEBT CRISIS: ADJUSTING TO THE PAST OR PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE 35-37
(Robert A. Pastor ed. 1987).
51
ROSS BUCKLEY, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: POLICY AND REGULATION 39
(2009).
52

For details of the Brady Plan, see id. at 39-54.

53
BUCKLEY, supra note 51, at 44. These are aggregate figures. Banks of different
countries chose different combinations of the three parts. German banks converted most of
their share into par bonds, Japanese banks chose discount bonds. Only U.S. and French banks
advanced new funds. Differences in regulatory and tax regimes accounted for the variations.
See id. at 44-45.

2010]

PIIGS, iTraxx SovX, NEOLIBERALISM

133

it received in new credits.54 Total indebtedness of Mexico, the country hardest hit by
the crisis, remained unchanged as the relief afforded by the discounted bonds was
offset by new loans. While before restructuring, Mexico’s net annual transfer to
lending banks was $3.24 billion, after the restructuring it was $3.59 billion.55 The
debt-servicing burden was borne by the most vulnerable who were denied health,
education, housing, and life with dignity. The economic cost of the Latin American
debt crisis was over two percent growth per year for the 1980s, and as a result it is
considered the “lost decade in Latin America.”56
The cycle repeated itself in the “tequila crisis” of the 1990s, the “Asian Flu” of
1997, the Russian default of 1998, and the Argentinean default of 2001. Banks from
the Global North channeled global access liquidity into imprudent and speculative
loans to developing economies. The debt burdens soon became unsustainable. The
ensuing crises were then used by the Treasury-Wall Street-IMF complex to force
further liberalization of capital markets and the financial sector. The cost was always
borne by the working classes by way of austerity measures that typically involved a
role back of the welfare safety net and reversal of wage concessions. The drama that
has unfolded in Greece since the fall of 2009 has followed this script to the letter.
VII. U.S. CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICIT: AN IMPERIAL TITHE?
The Americanization and liberalization of global finance did achieve a primary
goal of the neoliberal counterrevolution. It made it possible for global savings to
flow to the U.S. at an unprecedented scale. These capital flows can be seen as “an
imperial tithe.”57 Because of the dominant imperial role of the U.S. in global finance,
balance of payments deficits appear not to have the same implications for the U.S. as
they do for any other state. As early as 1971, the Federal Reserve of Boston pointed
that “this asymmetry appears to be appropriate, for it corresponds to an asymmetry
in the real world.”58 In tune with this position, Paul O’Neill, U.S. Treasury
Secretary, argued that for the U.S. the current account was a “meaningless
concept.”59 Alan Greenspan placed the U.S. current account deficit “far down the
list” of imbalances about which to be concerned.60 This is where an overwhelming
54
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non-market force comes into play, i.e., the U.S. imperial domination ensured that
foreign exchange surplus from around the world, particularly from Asia, would fund
escalating U.S. fiscal and current account deficits. Under the weight of this factor,
the theory that exchange rates adjust in response to external imbalances became
inoperative for the U.S. This has allowed the U.S. to become “the superpower of
borrowing.”61 Due to the ability to borrow in its own currency, the U.S. monetary
and fiscal policy “suffers from no external constraints . . . . Not so much a free lunch
as an apparently ongoing free banquet.”62 The larger net effect of global neoliberal
financial flows is to transfer capital from high-saving to low-saving countries. The
United Nations estimates that in 2009 the net financial transfers (net capital flows
minus investment income payments) from developing countries to the developed
ones was $568 billion, compared with $891 billion in 2008.
The escalating U.S. current-account deficit and credit-driven consumer spending
allowed the U.S. economy to function as “the ‘Keynesian engine’ of the global
economy.”63 However, the end result of the debt-driven aggregate demand is that
over the last thirty years the average U.S. household is working more hours for less
pay and paying an increasing share of its income to creditor banks.
VIII. REGULATORY CAPTURE AND THE WALL STREET-WASHINGTON REVOLVING
DOOR
Louis Brandeis cautioned in 1914 that “the dominant element in our financial
oligarchy is the investment banker.”64 The Keynesian compromise and the New Deal
regulatory regimes had put a check on the power of finance capital. The neoliberal
re-regulation of the last thirty years dismantled those checks. The result was summed
up by Senator Richard Durban in April 2009: “[The banks are] the most powerful
lobby in Capitol Hill. And they frankly own the place.” Corporate media and
establishment journalists have proved to be cheerleaders of the phenomenon. For
example, Bob Woodward anointed Alan Greenspan as “Maestro” and credited him
for orchestrating “the American Boom.” Time magazine, on their cover, called the
Greenspan-Rubin-Summers trio “the Committee to Save the World.”65
Of course, this was before the 2008-09 financial meltdown and the Great
Recession. The debacle, however, did not slowdown the Wall Street-Washington
revolving door. Many of the same finance capital minions who crafted the policies
that resulted in the crash are now charged with fixing the broken system. Finance
capital representatives remain a dominant presence in the Obama administration.
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One indicator of finance capital’s influence over public policy is the sheer size of
the 2008-09 financial sector bailout compared to other major outlays of public
spending in U.S. history.66
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To make matters worse, lack of transparency in critical areas of financial policy
remains entrenched. For example, when Bloomberg News sought information about
the identity of beneficiaries of the 2008-09 bailouts, the Federal Reserve claimed that
the Freedom of Information Act did not extend to it. When Judge Loretta Presca of
the District Court of New York ruled against the Federal Reserve in this matter in
August 2009, the Federal Reserve appealed. The lack of transparency translates into
a lack of political accountability. It is no wonder that the recent legislative
deliberations about financial reforms were termed by a Congressional aide “a fake
debate,” and the final legislative package has been termed “Wall Street’s Big Win.”
Where there are winners, there are losers. The working classes lost out and now face
a “jobless recovery” and further shrinking of public services and welfare safety nets.
IX. CONCLUSION
Banking and finance play a critical role in the economy by channeling savings
towards productive investments. By the early twentieth century the lessons were
learned that, left to its own devices, finance capital tends towards unbridled
speculation and ends up playing havoc with the economy. The collective response
was a Keynesian compromise whereby finance capital was regulated both nationally
and internationally to put a check on speculation and to channel it to support the
productive economy. The result was an extended period of economic growth and
stability. Over the last thirty years, the neoliberal counter revolution reversed these
regimes and facilitated hegemony of finance capital. The result has been instability
and a widening of the gap between the rich and the poor. The 2008-09 financial
meltdown and the resulting Great Recession have furnished an opportunity to change
course and to contain the power and machinations of finance capital. Over 200 years
ago, Thomas Jefferson cautioned, “banking institutions are more dangerous than
standing armies.”67 Today, in “the age of leverage”68 and derivatives, finance capital
equipped with “financial weapons of mass destruction”69 can and do inflict more
destruction than an eighteenth century standing army ever could. To guard against
such destruction the working classes must insist upon transparency and
accountability of the finance capital. In order to protect democracy and the future of
the society, the oligarchy of finance capital must end.
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